One of the federal government's main elementary and secondary education programs is Title I, which allocates money for compensatory education to school districts based on child poverty. I use sharp changes in per-pupil grant amounts surrounding the release of decennial census data to identify effects of Title I on state and local education revenue, and how much the program ultimately increases spending by recipient school districts. I find that state and local revenue efforts initially are unaffected by Title I changes, but that local governments substantially and significantly crowd out changes in Title I within in a three-year period. JEL subject codes: H7, H4, I2.
I. INTRODUCTION
Title I is widely recognized as the federal government's single most important education program. It attempts to increase the resources of school districts that serve economically disadvantaged children, and cost $10.4 billion in FY 2002. It thus represents one-third of the U.S. Department of Education's elementary and secondary budget. The program makes nonmatching grants to school districts based on their number of poor children, and specifies that the grants be used so that educationally disadvantaged children receive compensatory education, such as small group instruction outside the classroom. Not only has Title I traditionally been the main way the federal government directly aids poor local schools, but among the 10 percent of school districts that rely most heavily on the program, Title I accounts for between 5 and 10 percent of total spending. Under the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB), the Title I program has taken on a new accountability role as well: schools designated as in need of improvement may lose Title I funds. 1 If other revenue sources to school districts systematically offset gains from Title I, the program will have less than its intended effect on the schooling experienced by poor children.
School districts' budgets are determined by as many as three levels of government, in addition to the federal government: states, local parent governments such as counties and municipalities, and school districts. Any of these other levels of government could potentially offset Title I revenue. If this is the case, federal dollars subsidize other levels of government rather than supplement instructional resources for poor children. In this paper, I estimate the effect of Title I on school spending, and examine how local and state governments respond to changes in the federal program.
One of this paper's benefits is that it will begin to untangle some of the controversy about the effects of Title I on achievement. Ultimately, Title I aims not merely to provide supplemental educational services to poor children, but to improve educational outcomes for these disadvantaged children. As a rule, the Title I evaluation literature looks for achievement to change as a direct result of Title I revenue, ignoring the possibility that some or all of the services it funds might have been provided in its absence (Borman and D'Agostino, 1996; Mast, 2001; Puma et al., 1993) . To the extent that state or local governments offset Title I by lowering their own spending on services to poor students, Title I will have diminished impact on students' educational experiences, and a finding of an insignificant treatment effect (as in the congressionally-mandated Prospects study, Puma et al., 1993) should be no surprise. Indeed, the common finding that Title I students exhibit no relative improvement could be entirely due to their having experienced few additional resources. The impact of a classroom aide, for example, should be the same regardless of whether her salary comes from Title I revenue or more local revenue. Given legislatures' current push for accountability in schools, it is important to understand whether the services funded by Title I are ineffective because they are poorly designed or because they do not represent net service increases.
Assessing the impact of Title I has been a challenge for previous empirical studies. This is because a district's poverty determines its Title I allocation, but poverty also affects a district through other channels. In particular, poverty affects a district's ability to raise revenue from its own residents, simply because their ability to pay is a continuous function of their incomes.
State aid to school districts is also a function of local poverty, although states generally use 3 measures of poverty based on a district's property wealth per pupil. It may seem impossible, therefore, to separate the effects of Title I on state and local revenue from the effects of poverty on all three revenue streams (Title I, state, and local). In this paper, I use an innovative identification strategy that exploits a key difference between Title I and state and local funds.
State and local revenue both depend on a district's current ability to pay and change continuously, as ability to pay changes continuously. In contrast, Title I traditionally has depended on child poverty counts from the decennial Censuses of Population, and these counts are updated only at 10-year intervals. 2 Thus, Title I allocations jumped discretely every 10 years while poverty (and the state and local revenues that depend on poverty) changed continuously.
Moreover, decennial census counts are first used in Title I allocations approximately three years after the information is gathered, so the census-based changes in poverty do not even include current changes in poverty (and it is current changes in poverty that affect state and local revenue). Because actual poverty is likely to change only slightly between adjacent years but the census-based child poverty count may change substantially, my identification strategy is essentially a regression discontinuity one.
Understanding the effects of Title I is not only important because the policy is important; it is also a rich problem in fiscal federalism that can reveal a great deal about how different levels of government interact. Title I is particularly well-suited for studying fiscal federalism for three reasons. First, because so many levels of government are involved in the determination of school spending, the problem is rich in potential interactions among governments. Second, because the data are detailed, I can show not just the immediate effects of Title I, but also district-and state-level reactions over several years, as they have time to respond. Third, the evaluation of many fiscal federalist policies is plagued by identification problems like the one that plagues Title I: because districts with more Title I funds are necessarily poorer than other districts, it is unlikely that they would have similar spending behavior, even in the absence of the program. That the Title I funding formula creates large, discrete changes in Title I funding when new decennial census data appear allows me to credibly identify the effects of Title I and overcome empirical problems that have plagued previous studies.
In short, I investigate the impact of Title I funding on schools' revenues and spending, distinguishing the effect of Title I from the effect of poverty by exploiting sharp census-based changes in per-pupil grants between the 1992 and 1993 school years (I refer to school years by the calendar year of the fall throughout). 3 I find that school revenues and spending initially experience dollar-for-dollar increases with Title I, but that-over time-school districts' revenues respond, significantly offsetting the impact of the Title I revenue. Three years after receiving increases in Title I, poor school districts have little to no increases in school spending over what would have been the case without the Title I increase.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In section two, I present background information on the Title I program and review the literature on Title I. In section three, I review the theory and empirical literature on the intergovernmental grants. In section four, I discuss the methodology, in section five the data, and in section six the results. Section seven concludes. decennial data in this paper. ON TITLE I   Title I, the largest federal education program, was passed into law in the 1965 Elementary   and Secondary Education Act as part of the Johnson administration's War on Poverty. 4 While   the current legislation details requirements of the Title I program, focusing on standards, assessments, and accountability, the guidance on how school districts are to use Title I funds is and traditionally has been broad: they should be used to improve academic performance of children at risk of school failure, either targeting only the educationally neediest students in the school or, in some circumstances, using a schoolwide approach. 5 Table 1 shows the distribution of Title I funds per low-income pupil, per pupil, and as a percentage of all spending for all school districts in 1992, the base year for my analysis. The median participating district received about $800 per low-income pupil and about $100 per pupil from Title I, with just over 10 percent of districts receiving more than $1000 per low-income pupil and more than $250 per pupil. 6
II. BACKGROUND
In the early years of Title I in the late 1960s and early 1970s, several clear cases of school districts using Title I funds to replace other types of revenue emerged and were the subject of federal audits. For example, a complaint brought by the Harvard Center for Law and Education on behalf of the children of the Bernalillo school district in Sandoval, New Mexico in 1970 described how "arts and crafts is paid for out of Title I funds on the theory that it will increase 6 'small muscle' coordination" as just one of multiple non-compliance problems in the district (Harvard Center for Law and Education 1972) .
Complaints such as this one led to the inclusion of several enforcement mechanisms in the legislation. The "maintenance of effort" requirement attempts to ensure that Title I "sticks" to school district spending. It mandates that either state and local revenue per pupil or aggregate state and local revenue cannot fall below 90 percent of their levels in the preceding fiscal year without penalty. 7 In 1992, Title I provided about 2 percent of total spending for the average district. For the 1 percent of districts relying most heavily on Title I, their Title I revenue approached 10 percent of total spending, but their new Title I funds in any given year are only a fraction of that. Thus, even if a state or district wanted to completely substitute new Title I revenue for old state or local revenue, it would be able to do so by cutting combined state and local revenue by less than 10 percent, and the maintenance of effort requirement would not bind.
In short, the maintenance of effort clause is irrelevant for even the poorest districts (and thus for this empirical investigation), except perhaps as "moral suasion."
To my knowledge, Feldstein (1978) is the only empirical analysis that examines the effect of Title I on state and local revenue while explicitly considering poverty's simultaneous influence on Title I, state, and local revenue. At the time of his study, Title I funds were distributed to school districts based in part on the rank of their poverty rate within their county, not just on the number of poor children living in the district (this is no longer the case). Feldstein exploited the cross-sectional variation in Title I funding per pupil resulting from the fact that 7 rankings were not fully collinear with absolute poverty, and found that for every additional dollar of Title I revenue, total spending was about 80 cents higher.
III. INTERGOVERNMENTAL GRANTS AND THE FLYPAPER EFFECT
My investigation is related to a substantial literature on an empirical puzzle dubbed "the flypaper effect." The puzzle is the following. Economic theory predicts that a jurisdiction receiving an intergovernmental lump-sum grant will view the grant as income and will spend it just as it would spend other income, with a fraction (equal to the jurisdiction's marginal propensity to spend on the targeted service, and possibly only a small share) going to that area, and the remainder going to other projects or to tax reduction. Many empirical studies, however, have observed that the marginal propensity to spend an intergovernmental grant on the targeted government service is higher than the marginal propensity to spend other income on that service.
Arthur Okun called this empirical regularity the flypaper effect because money "sticks where it hits" unduly. Depending on whether the flypaper effect is strong or weak for Title I, the program is very important or much less important than the accounting data suggest.
There is a large literature focused on estimating the effect of various intergovernmental grants to state and local governments. Hines and Thaler (1995) provide an excellent review of this literature, and Fisher and Papke (1999) provide a review of education-specific flypaper research. Researchers typically find that an additional dollar of intergovernmental grant increases expenditures on the targeted program by much more than the receiving government's propensity to spend on that program out of regular income, corresponding to a strong flypaper effect. 8 Estimates range from $0.25 for every $1.00 of grant received to $1.00 for every $1.00 of 8 grant received, with most estimates clustered at the top end of this range. Knight's (2002) recent addition to this literature, however, indicates that controlling for endogeneity of grant amounts (in his particular case, federal highway funding to states, he considers political endogeneity of grants) reveals significant crowd-out, suggesting that some observed flypaper effects may be statistical artifacts.
The flypaper literature is generally concerned with how targeted expenditures respond to intergovernmental grants. When the spending jurisdiction receives revenue from multiple sources, however, the individual revenue responses that ultimately determine the net effect on spending are of independent interest themselves. In this case, because the typical school district today receives approximately the same amount from the state as it raises at the local level, it is important to consider the effects that federal grants may have on both state revenue to local school districts and revenue raised locally. A state may respond to its poor districts' receipt of large Title I grants by redirecting money away from education aid to poor districts and towards other areas (e.g., tax reduction, health care, criminal justice), such that the total revenues received by the school district increase by some amount less than the federal grant. Local revenue responses can come through school districts themselves changing their tax rates, or, in some cases, through parent governments. 9
IV. METHODOLOGY
A typical test of the flypaper effect exploits longitudinal changes in intergovernmental grant amounts to estimate the effect of a change in the grant amount on the change in targeted expenditures at the state or local level. In the most basic ordinary least squares (OLS) specification, equation (1) would be used:
where d indexes the school district, and the change is taken over any period in which Title I grants change. Finally, I explain how the use of average state education spending in the title I allocation formula poses an endogeneity problem for OLS and describe an instrumental variables approach to this problem.
The structure of Title I grants and the grant allocation process
My identification strategy relies on the formula used to allocate Title I funds in 1991 through 1995. I use the formula in its entirety to predict a district's grant before and after the census updating; the reader should focus on three facts from the following description of the Title I formula. First, the grants were mainly determined by decennial census child poverty data.
Decennial child poverty figures jump discretely whereas state and local revenue change more continuously with continuous changes in poverty; furthermore, the updates were not a function of current changes in poverty (which might have affected outcomes) but changes in poverty that were already out of date. Second, the grants were partially determined by state-level education with parent governments are dependent on them, meaning that the district receives all local revenue through the parent government and cannot raise revenue at the district level.
spending, which is obviously related to key dependent variables, such as instructional spending and state revenue to local districts; when I use census-determined changes in Title I to instrument for actual changes in Title I, this purges the effect of changes in state education spending from changes in Title I. Third, the Title I allocation formula is sufficiently complex that the updates were a highly non-linear, even "jumpy" function of changes in child poverty whereas state and local revenue is likely to be a more linear function of poverty.
The federal Department of Education distributes two types of grants to the states, with allocations specified at the county level. 10 States then distribute grants to school districts within the counties. The Title I formula used child poverty data from the 1980 census for allocations through 1992, and then switched to the 1990 data beginning with 1993. 11 Title I allocations also reflected adjusted mean state per-pupil expenditure (SPPE), used as an education cost index. 12
The Title I formula allots a set share of SPPE per poor child, then revises allocations through an iterative process to comply with hold-harmless and small state minimum requirements. 13 Once a state had the Title I grant for each of its counties, it redistributed the grants to school districts within each county based on poverty, following the same eligibility and distribution rules as the federal distribution to counties. 14 I can therefore summarize a district's Title I allocation in a given year as a non-linear function TI of the most recent decennial child poverty counts (POOR) and adjusted mean per pupil expenditure in the state (SPPE), which is updated annually to the three-year lagged value (for simplicity, my notation indexes SPPE by the actual year rather than the year of the lagged value): TI 92 = TI(POOR 80 , SPPE 92 ) and TI 93 = TI(POOR 90 , SPPE 93 ).
Regression discontinuity surrounding the release of 1990 census data
One would expect the OLS approach in equation (1) pupil for both the one-and three-year specifications, as well as in the first stage. That the coefficients on the simulated per-pupil changes are consistently less than one is not inconsistent with the strong predictive power of the instrument. To isolate the effect of the poverty data updating, the census-determined per-pupil changes are simulated using different levels of mean state per-pupil expenditures than were used in the actual allocation process.
First stage results
There are also several potential sources of measurement error. There is likely reporting error in for larger school districts. I use a combination cutoff and weighting method to minimize the impact of small school district replication error, limiting the sample to school districts with enrollments of at least 200 students in each year of the analysis and weighting school districts by their 1992 enrollments. 18 This strategy avoids using the most error-laden school districts with fewer than 200 students, and relies more heavily on the larger districts with the cleanest replication. These districts are also of greater policy interest, as they receive the bulk of Title I funding. The majority of dropped districts were dropped because they were missing in the data from at least one of the key years and thus did not merge into my final sample. I also dropped all districts from certain states problematic in this context. 19 Table 4 presents summary statistics for my key variables, dividing the sample into school districts predicted to gain Title I funds with the census updating and those predicted to lose funds. This divides the sample into roughly equal groups, with 3,475 districts predicted to gain funds and 3,572 predicted to lose funds. Districts predicted to gain funds are on average larger than those losing funds, but other differences between districts are small.
VI. RESULTS
I examine short-run responses to Title I changes over the first year following the use of the 1990 census in the allocations, from the 1992 to 1993 school years, over the two-year period from 1992 to 1994, and longer-run responses for the three-year change from 1992 to 1995. My discussion focuses on the IV results in columns 1 and 3 in Table 5 , which present results for oneand three-year changes. The two-year changes, in column 2, generally fall about midway between the one-and three-year changes. OLS results, which are largely consistent with the instrumental variable (IV) results in Table 5 , are reported in the Appendix. 20 All regression results are in per-pupil terms.
Short-run responses to census-determined changes in Title I
In the first year following census updating, Title I exhibits classic flypaper properties. It sticks about dollar for dollar to total revenue and to instructional spending, without inducing offsetting responses in local or state education revenue. Column 1 of Table 5 reports IV estimates of the effects of census-determined changes in Title I per pupil for the one-year period following the introduction of the new census data. The first line shows the effect on total revenue, which is the sum of effects on state, local, and federal revenue. 21 A one-dollar increase in Title I translates into a $0.98 increase in total revenue (with a standard error of 0.41) and a 19 $1.40 increase in instructional spending (with a standard error of 0.55), with both effects significant at the five-percent level. Standard errors in all of the analyses are sufficiently large, however, that I emphasize the direction and significance of results throughout and caution against strict interpretation of specific coefficients. More generally, then, changes in total revenue and instructional spending for the one-year period are significantly positive and insignificantly different from one. 
Longer-run responses to census-determined changes in Title I
Changes in Title I initially significantly increased total revenue about dollar for dollar, but over time, the effect of Title I on total revenue (and, correspondingly, on instructional spending) became smaller: Column 2 of Table 5 shows that two years after the census updating, a one-dollar increase in Title I caused a local revenue decline of 95 cents, and an increase in total revenue of 54 cents. In Column 3, we see that by three years after the census updating, a onedollar increase in Title I was associated with an insignificant 4-cent decline in total revenue. This is because over time, local (but not state) revenue responds more negatively to Title I increases, falling about dollar for dollar (the coefficient is 1.21), with Title I gains over the threeyear period.
While the response of total state revenue remained positive but insignificant over the three-year period, rising 25 cents with each dollar of Title I, it is interesting to note that this results from significant and opposing changes in formula and categorical aid. 
Effects of aggregate state-level changes in Title I
While any explicit acknowledgement of the Title I funds in a state formula would be difficult to justify, particularly given the complexity of the Title I formula, states could certainly tweak their formulas in ways that will benefit or penalize districts who happen to share characteristics with districts likely to gain or lose Title I funds.
To test this possibility, I group districts by whether their state, in the aggregate, gained or lost Title I funds per pupil. 
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Changes in aggregated state Title I grants from 1991 to 1992 clustered around a 10 percent increase, which was the amount by which the total appropriation for Title I increased over those years.
Source: U.S. Department of Education administrative data. 
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